Category Archives: Invited Presentations

Information about David’s invited presentations – typically posters or talks.

A Unified Cognitive Model of Visual Filling-In Based on an Emergic Network Architecture [Thesis Defense Presentation]

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2013) A Unified Cognitive Model of Visual Filling-In Based on an Emergic Network Architecture [Thesis Defense Presentation], pp. 1-28. Carleton University. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.2603.5687] (pdf)

Leibovitz (2012) Thesis IntroductionAbstract: Presented at the defense for a thesis titled “A Unified Cognitive Model of Visual Filling-In Based on an Emergic Network Architecture“.

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Emergence of epistemic phenomena (poster)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2012) Emergence of epistemic phenomena. Poster presented at the Institute of Cognitive Science Spring Conference (ICSSC) of Carleton University, pp. 1-12. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.  [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.4649.3920] (PDF)

Leibovitz (2012) Emergence of Epistemic Phenomena (ICSSC Poster)Abstract: Q: Are you using the correct level of analysis?

We claim that for the unique requirements of cognition

  1. There is only one micro level of ontology, realization and causal explanation (the systems level)
    1. It is process oriented
    2. It can causally explain all higher level behaviours and phenomena
  2. There are no higher levels of causal explanation
    1. Causality flows among actual ontological parts, not to or from epistemic abstractions Under the standard macro level approach, we further claim that
  3. There are no macro level stimuli, measurements and phenomena – they are epistemic illusions
    1. Merely arbitrary and uninformed patterns of micro-level inputs or outputs between an experimental paradigm and a non-representational cognitive agent

Our claims originate from our unified process model of visual filling-in. We noticed that while the model explains all the phenomena, none of them actually existed. The epistemic phenomena arise from oversimplified and implicit folk-theories. Epistemic phenomena emerge from lack of knowledge, from lack of a Systems level theory.

We show the results – the visual demonstration for a variety of “phenomena”. Your task:

Show me the macro level stimuli, measurement or phenomena!

It is only by getting rid of the macro level of analysis that one can hope to uncover a (micro) systems level and begin to causally unify explanations for cognition.

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Emergence in the Mind’s Eye (talk)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2011) Emergence in the Mind’s Eye. Talk presented for the ICS Colloquium series at Carleton University, pp. 1-46, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1842.6088]

Leibovitz (2011) Emergence in the Mind's EyeAbstract: A cognitive model of visual processing will be presented. Two cognitive functions will interact to produce many visual phenomena in the mind’s eye. Then again, emergence itself is an illusion…

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Local Measure Reliability vs. Global Concept Validity. Has Cognitive Science Moved Beyond Behaviourism? (Insignificant Progress in Validating Cognitive Constructs p<.05)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2011) Local Measure Reliability vs. Global Concept Validity. Has Cognitive Science Moved Beyond Behaviourism? (Insignificant Progress in Validating Cognitive Constructs p<.05). Poster presented at the Institute of Cognitive Science Spring Conference (ICSSC) of Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.2792.8801]

Zero Progress in CognitionAbstract: Every cognitive experiment contributes to the factual accumulation of raw, stimulus-response behavioural  data. The raw data are factual/indisputable in that 95+% scientists understand and can reproduce the operationalized procedure and measures despite validity and interpretation concerns. Nevertheless, there has been zero factual accumulation of cognitive constructs and interpretations as there is no 95+% agreement nor comprehension in the sea of hypotheticals. Indeed, the signal to noise ratio worsens (entropy increases) with every experiment as new micro-theories are created, rather than a scientific reduction (convergence) to unity.

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Vision, Spiders & Time (talk)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2011) Vision, Spiders & Time. Talk presented at Carleton University, pp. 1-34, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.4201.9047]

Abstract: How is vision perception related to imagination and planning? What is the role of attention (saccades)? Can smart spiders shed light on human cognition?

  • They have severe engineering restrictions
  • They take a long time to think
  • How does that affect cognition
I will relate spider time to practical matters. Hopefully, you will also come to appreciate spiders as well :).
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Philosophy Behind the Cognitive Modelling of Virtual Eyeballs (talk)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2011) Philosophy Behind the Cognitive Modelling of Virtual Eyeballs. Talk presented at Carleton University, pp. 1-50, Ottawa, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.4103.6003]

Abstract: David will demonstrate a virtual eyeball intended to model the Lilac Chaser illusion. In particular, he will talk about the philosophy behind his Emergic Approach to cognitive modelling. Topics may include:

  1. Cutting Nature at her Joints – What kind of Butcher do you want to be?
  2. Tri-Level hypothesis does more harm than good (Marr vs. Simon)
  3. What is a function, computation, behaviour or phenomena?
  4. Unification as constraining the 20 Questions posed to Mother Nature
  5. Emergence
  6. Top-Down Design vs. Bottom-Up Re-engineering

Emergic Approach LogoDavid’s intent is to demonstrate that philosophic considerations can positively influence theory construction. We are all influenced by philosophy – do we want to take charge of our path?

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Emergic Approach: Philosophy Applied to Cognition (talk)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2010) Emergic Approach: Philosophy Applied to Cognition. Talk presented to Complex Adaptive Systems Group at Carleton University, pp. 1-36, Ottawa, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1613.2329] (pdf)

Abstract: Leibovitz (2010) Emergic Approach- Philosophy Applied to CognitionPrologue, Research Problems, Answers, Philosophy & Metaphors, Hypotheses, Solution: Emergic Approach, Lilac Chaser Illusion, Lilac Chaser Model, Discussion.

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Changeons & Predictons

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2010) Changeons & Predictons. Talk presented to the Complex Adaptive Systems Group at Carleton University, pp. 1-7, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3972.5281]

Abstract: Taylor Series expansion leads to Newton’s Method of Divided Differences used in Babbage’s Difference Engine. However, errors accumulate beyond region of expansion. My recurrence relation does not have this problem.

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Lilac Chaser Illusion and Virtual Eyeballs (talk)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2010) Lilac Chaser Illusion and Virtual Eyeballs. Talk presented at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.2268.5923]

Lilac-ChaserAbstract: David Leibovitz will give a live demo of his research-in-progress and discuss the nature of his research and future plans. David will demonstrate a framework, whereby a Virtual Eye is looking at the Lilac Chaser visual illusion. Currently, the implementation has a minimal cognitive component, a set of photoreceptors for the fovea, and saccadic jitter for the eye.

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Emergic Memories: A Model of Emergent Properties

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2009) Emergic Memories: A Model of Emergent Properties. Poster presented at the Cognitive Science Spring Conference of Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3005.8722]

Leibovitz (2009) Emergic Memories- A Model of Emergent PropertiesAbstract:

  • In physics, there is no mystery behind emergence (Crane 2001). Explanatory bridges between levels of analysis are mostly complete. Emergence is considered as “weak” and the a-priori unpredictability of these bridges is considered an epistemological problem – not ontological. It is noteworthy that the current analytical toolset of physics is based on behaviours and continuous change – a process metaphysics (PM).
  • In cognition, their are no accepted bridges between the mental and physical divide and “strong” ontological versions of emergence remain viable. Without empirical support, rational thought has produced a proliferating plethora of possible flavours and sources of emergence. It is noteworthy that the analytical tradition of cognition is based on static  substances with properties  – a substance metaphysics (SM).
  • Purpose of the Emergic Memory Model
    • Ground debate in simple (yet empirically real) parts, wholes & relations
    • Basis for comparison and discussion among competing hypotheses
    • Generate new insights and hypothesis
      • Emergence is due to epistemological incompleteness and objectification errors
    • Based on change, yet has substance-like properties
      • A substance/process metaphysics hybrid
      • The locus of emergic debate?

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Cognition Requires Philosophy: Towards Unity (talk)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2009) Cognition Requires Philosophy: Towards Unity. Talk presented at Carleton University, pp. 1-73, Ottawa, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.2989.4889]

Leibovitz (2009) Cognition Requires PhilosophyAbstract: Even within the interdisciplinary field of Cognitive Science, philosophy is often ignored by non-philosophers. David will argue that in order for cognitive science to advance towards a united view of the mind, philosophy must be taken more seriously. However, philosophy too must work towards unity and a language of discourse more accessible to non-philosophers. David will discuss the relation between Philosophy and Science and how the special needs of Cognition are not being met.

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Plants, Cognition, Time (& Philosophy)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2008) Plants, Cognition, Time (& Philosophy). Talk presented at Carleton University, pp. 1-28, Ottawa, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.2470.3209]

Abstract: When plants are viewed under various time and spatial scales, their behaviour can appear quite intelligent. This presentation simply aims at questioning some of the basic terminology used by Philosophers of Mind, and Cognitive Scientists. The goal of the presentation is not to answer the following questions, but to stimulate discussion and reflection.

What do we mean by all the aforementioned terms, and how do we clarify them so that plants are once again relegated to simple stimulus-response systems?

The parting thought is in showing that a trivial stimulus-response system is Turing Complete, so perhaps pointing to individual plant processes and showing that each one alone is a stimulus-response portion might miss the overall system-wide intelligence…

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Distinctive Serial Recall Effects

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Leibovitz, D. P., Nath, U., Sedghi, R., Verger, D. (2006) Distinctive Serial Recall Effects. Poster presented at the Cognitive Science Spring Conference of Carleton University, pp. 1-18, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.2012.5926]

Leibovitz, Nath, Sedghi & Verger (2006) Distinctive Serial Recall EffectsAbstract: The study of word-length effect concentrated mostly on the accuracy of recalling short and long words in both pure and mixed lists. Previous studies showed that pure long lists were much poorly remembered. Hulme et al. (2004) found that word-length effect could be abolished in mixed lists when the short and long words are alternated. We investigated distinctiveness and found it to be a salient cue for improved correct recall when the list of words has a single distinctive transition. Lists contained three short words following by three long words and vice versa. Surprisingly, in the short-long condition, there was also an improvement in position 3 recall. One of the possible explanations could be the strategic shift of working memory resource.

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Snoring To Attention (poster)

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Leibovitz, D. P. (2005) Snoring To Attention. Poster presented at the Cognitive Science Spring Conference of Carleton University, pp. 1-16, Ottawa, Canada. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1357.2324]

Abstract: Why don’t you hear your own snoring, while your partner does?

A Perceptual Learning and Matching System (PLMS) is hypothesized that pre-attends the auditory scene during sleep with the goal of classifying sounds into the background to be ignored or into the foreground which will cause arousal for further conscious action. It is also active while an individual is awake and is responsible for the automatic acquisition of capabilities such as non-conceptual linguistic components.

In the case of chaotic snoring sounds, the partner’s PLMS cannot detect a pattern and will awaken the partner, while the snorer’s PLMS will correlate the snoring sounds directly with the individual’s own breathing pattern and hence, ignore it.

The main purpose of this investigation is to understand the functional characteristics of PLMS during a sleep paradigm which is not confounded by consciousness nor rationality. PLMS is a hitherto new cognitive system not before studied.

A secondary purpose is to investigate whether the PLMS of the snorer’s partner can be trained to ignore the snoring sounds. Several experiments are proposed to verify this possibility. Partners of snorers may be more affected than the snorers themselves!

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